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Abstract:Disputes over sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the
maritime zones claimed by the countries that border the South China Sea have been
rising since May 2009. This paper examines recent developments concerning jurisdic鄄
tional disputes in the South China Sea by focusing on potential conflicts between Chi鄄
na and the United States, and concludes by suggesting that a number of actions could
be taken by China and the United States to help avoid potential disputes that may a鄄
rise from conflicting interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of the
LOS Convention in the Spratly area.
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玉. Introduction
Disputes over sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the maritime zones
claimed by the countries that border the South China Sea have been rising since May
2009. As a result of a deadline set by the United Nations Commission on the Limits
of Continental Shelf (CLCS)淤 for countries to submit their claims to extended conti鄄
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nental shelves, that is, 13 May 2009,淤 there have been seen a flurry of claims made
by the countries in the region. 于 In response to the submissions, counter鄄claims to
sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the overlapping or disputed South
China Sea areas have also been made by China ( including Taiwan), Vietnam, Ma鄄
laysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. 盂 These claims and counter鄄claims have made
the existing South China Sea disputes even more complicated and difficult to manage.
The United States takes no position on competing territorial claims in the South
China Sea. Since 2009, however, it has become increasingly involved in the mari鄄
time jurisdictional disputes, particularly in the context of China蒺s increasing assertive鄄
ness in the disputed waters. Recent developments concerning jurisdictional disputes
in the South China Sea are likely to give rise to disputes between China and the Unit鄄
ed States over the interpretation and application of relevant rules of international law
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At the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, held in New York, 14-18 May 2001, the States Par鄄
ties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea decided, inter alia, that “[i]n the
case of a State Party for which the Convention entered into force before 13 May 1999, it is un鄄
derstood that the ten鄄year time period referred to in Article 4 of Annex 域 to the Convention
shall be taken to have commenced on 13 May 1999. 冶 See SPLOS / 72, 20 May 2001, at ht鄄
tp: / / daccess - dds - ny. un. org / doc / UNDOC / GEN / N01 / 387 / 64 / PDF / N0138764. pdf?
OpenElement, 10 December 2012.
Malaysia and Vietnam submitted their joint application (in the southern part of the South China
Sea) on 6 May 2009; and Vietnam ( in the northern part of the South China Sea) on 7 May
2009. In accordance with the decision made at the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties to the
LOS Convention, China and Brunei submitted their preliminary information indicative of the
outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles on 11 May 2009 and 12 May
2009, respectively. See Submissions, through the Secretary鄄General of the United Nations, to
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, pursuant to Article 76, paragraph 8, of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, updated on 7 Octo鄄
ber 2011, at http: / / www. un. org / Depts / los / clcs_new / commission_submissions. htm, 10 De鄄
cember 2012, and Preliminary Information indicative of the Outer limits of the Continental Shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles, updated on 19 October 2011, at http: / / www. un. org / Depts / los /
clcs_new / commission_preliminary. htm, 10 December 2012.
For Communication to the Secretary鄄General of the United Nations, dated 7 May 2009 ( from
China); Communication dated 8 May 2009 ( from Vietnam); Communication dated 4 August
2009 (from the Philippines); Communication dated 18 August 2009 (from Vietnam); Commu鄄
nication dated 21 August 2009 (from Malaysia); Communication dated 8 July 2010 ( from In鄄
donesia); Communication dated 5 April 2011 (from the Philippines); Communication dated 14
April 2011 (from China); and Communication dated 3 May 2011 (from Vietnam), at http: / /
www. un. org / Depts / los / clcs_new / submissions_ files / submission_ idn. htm, http: / / www. un.
org / Depts / los / clcs_new / submissions_files / submission_mysvnm_33_2009. htm, and http: / /
www. un. org / Depts / los / clcs_new / submissions_files / submission_vnm_37_2009. htm, 10 De鄄
cember 2012. For Taiwan蒺s statements made on 5 May, 8 May, and 12 May 2009, at http: / /
www. mofa. gov. tw / webapp / ct. asp? xItem = 40533&ctNode = 2039&mp = 1, 10 December
2012. (in Chinese)
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that govern the rights and duties of the United States in the waters of the South China
Sea that are claimed by China as its territorial sea, exclusive economic zone (EEZ),
or continental shelf. These rules are reflected in the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention) that was adopted on 30 April 1982, opened for
signature on 10 December 1982, and entered into force on 16 November 1994. 淤
The purpose of this paper is to examine recent developments concerning jurisdic鄄
tional disputes in the South China Sea by focusing on potential conflicts between Chi鄄
na and the United States. It is organized into five parts. Part one summarizes China蒺s
sovereignty and maritime claims in the South China Sea. Part two reviews recent de鄄
velopments concerning jurisdictional disputes in the region. Part three discusses U.
S. interest and policy in the South China Sea. Part four analyzes potential conflicts
between China and the United States over maritime jurisdiction in the region. Part
five explores the way for managing potential jurisdictional disputes between China and
the United States in the waters around the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands.
域. China蒺s Sovereignty and Maritime Claims
in the South China Sea
摇 摇 On 4 September 1958, China issued a declaration on territorial sea. 于 Provision
1 of the declaration provides that:
This width of the territorial sea of the People蒺s Republic of China is twelve nautical
miles. The provision applies to all Territories of the People蒺s Republic of China,
including … the Dongsha [Pratas] Islands, the Xisha [Paracel] Islands, the
Zhongsha Islands [Macclesfield Bank], the Nansha [Spratly] Islands and other





U. N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted 30 April 1982, opened for signature 10 De鄄
cember 1982, and entered into force 16 November 1994, 1833 U. N. T. S. 397. As of 20 Sep鄄
tember 2011, the treaty had 162 parties. For more information, at http: / / www. un. org / Depts /
los / reference_files / status2010. pdf, 10 December 2012.
Declaration on the Government of the People蒺s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea, ap鄄
proved by the 100 th Session of the Standing Committee of the First National People蒺s Congress on
4 September 1958, at http: / / www. state. gov / documents / organization / 58832. pdf, 10 Decem鄄
ber 2012.
Declaration on the Government of the People蒺s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea, ap鄄
proved by the 100 th Session of the Standing Committee of the First National People蒺s Congress on
4 September 1958.
The declaration formed the basis for all subsequent Chinese claims over the
islands of the South China Sea. It also asked foreign aircraft and military vessels to
obtain permission from the Chinese government before entering its territorial sea and
the sky above the territorial sea. 淤
On 25 February 1992, China adopted and promulgated the Law of the People蒺s
Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (the PRC Territori鄄
al Sea Law). 于 Article 2 of the law provides that “The territorial sea of the People蒺s
Republic of China is the sea belt adjacent to the land territory and internal waters of
the People蒺s Republic of China. 冶盂 The Chinese land territory includes the Pratas
Islands, the Paracel Islands, the Macclesfield Bank, and the Spratly Islands that are
situated in the South China Sea. 榆 Article 6 of the law provides that foreign ships for
military purposes must obtain permission from the Chinese government before entering
China蒺s territorial sea. 虞 In addition, under Article 7, “Foreign submarines and other
underwater vehicles, when passing through the territorial sea of the People蒺s Republic
of China, shall navigate on the surface and show their flag. 冶愚
In May 1996, during the deliberation on ratification of the LOS Convention, the
Chinese deputy foreign minister Li Zhaoxing stated that China蒺s consistent position on
the South China Sea issue and its efforts to safeguard the sovereignty and maritime
rights over the Spratly Islands would not be affected by ratification of the treaty, be鄄
cause China can still preserve and protect its rights and interests in the South China
Sea based on the nine鄄dashed line map and the traditional activities conducted by the
Chinese fishers in the Spratly area. 舆 He suggested that a claim to historic title or tra鄄
511
Sovereignty and Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea:








Provision 3 of the Declaration on the Government of the People蒺s Republic of China on the Terri鄄
torial Sea, approved by the 100 th Session of the Standing Committee of the First National
People蒺s Congress on 4 September 1958.
Office of Ocean Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Af鄄
fairs, United States Department of State, Straight Baselines Claim: China, Limits in the Sea,
No. 117, 1996, at http: / / www. state. gov / documents / organization / 57692. pdf, 10 December
2012.
Article 2 of the Law of the People蒺s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, 1992.
Article 2 of the Law of the People蒺s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, 1992.
Article 6 of the Law of the People蒺s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, 1992.
Article 7 of the Law of the People蒺s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, 1992.
Explanation concerning the Proposal to Consider the Ratification of the United Nations Conven鄄
tion on the Law of the Sea, Li Zhaoxing, Deputy Foreign Minister, at the 19 th Meeting of the
Standing Committee of the Eighth National People蒺s Congress on 15 May 1996.
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ditional fishing rights can be made in the South China Sea after China蒺s ratification of
the treaty. In addition, he said, China should also make a statement on the South
China Sea islands issue and reiterate its position on the requirement for foreign mili鄄
tary vessels to obtain advance approval from or give prior notification to the coastal
State before entering its territorial sea. 淤
On 15 May 1996, when ratifying the LOS Convention, China, in accordance
with Article 310 of the LOS Convention, made a four鄄point statement, in which it re鄄
affirms the Chinese sovereignty over all its archipelagos and islands as listed in Arti鄄
cle 2 of the PRC Territorial Sea Law. It also reiterated China蒺s position on the right of
a coastal State to request, in accordance with its law and regulations, foreign military
vessels to obtain permission from or give prior notification to the coastal State for the
passage through the territorial sea of the coastal State. 于 On the same day, in accord鄄
ance with the PRC Territorial Sea Law, China announced the baselines of part of its
territorial sea adjacent to the mainland and those of the territorial sea adjacent to the
Paracel Islands. 盂
On 26 June 1998, China enacted the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and
the Continental Shelf of the People蒺s Republic of China (the PRC EEZ Law). 榆 Arti鄄
cle 2 of the law provides that the EEZ of China is an area beyond and adjacent to its
territorial sea extending to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from
which the breadth of Chinese territorial sea is measured. Under the same article, the
Chinese continental shelf “ comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas
that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land
territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical






Explanation concerning the Proposal to Consider the Ratification of the United Nations Conven鄄
tion on the Law of the Sea, Li Zhaoxing, Deputy Foreign Minister, at the 19 th Meeting of the
Standing Committee of the Eighth National People蒺s Congress on 15 May 1996.
The English text of the Chinese statement, at http: / / www. un. org / Depts / los / convention_a鄄
greements / convention_declarations. htm, 10 December 2012.
Declaration of the Government of the People蒺s Republic of China on the baselines of the territo鄄
rial sea, 15 May 1996, at http: / / www. un. org / depts / los / LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES / PD鄄
FFILES / CHN_1996_Declaration. pdf, 10 December 2012.
Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the People蒺s Republic of Chi鄄
na, adopted at the 3rd Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People蒺s Con鄄
gress on 26 June 1998 and promulgated by Order No. 6 of the President of the People蒺s Repub鄄
lic of China on 26 June 1998, at http: / / www. asianlii. org / cn / legis / cen / laws / loteezatcsot鄄
proc790 / , 10 December 2012.
where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance. 冶淤
China exercises sovereign rights and jurisdiction in its EEZ and continental shelf. 于 In
addition, Article 14 of the law provides that “The provisions of this Act shall not af鄄
fect the historic rights of the People蒺s Republic of China. 冶盂
On 7 May 2009, in response to the joint submission by Vietnam and Malaysia to
the CLCS concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical mi鄄
les in the southern part of the South China Sea, China submitted a Note Verbale to
the Secretary鄄General of the United Nations, stating, inter alia, that “China has in鄄
disputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent wa鄄
ters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as
the seabed and subsoil thereof. 冶榆 A map of the U鄄shaped claim, with its 9-dashed
line in the South China Sea, was attached to the diplomatic note.
In April 2011, in response to a communication sent by the Philippines to the
Secretary鄄General of the United Nations to challenge the Chinese claim to sovereignty
over the Spratly Islands and their “adjacent waters冶 and sovereign rights and jurisdic鄄
tion over the “relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof冶 as indicated
in the attached U鄄shaped line map, China submitted a diplomatic note to the U. N.
Secretary鄄General, asserting, among other things, that “under the relevant provisions
of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, as well as the Law of
the People蒺s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
(1992) and the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of
the People蒺s Republic of China (1998), China蒺s Nansha Islands [Spratly Islands]
[are] fully entitled to Territorial Sea, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Conti鄄
nental Shelf. 冶虞
Based on the aforementioned Chinese declarations, statements, diplomatic
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Articles 2 of the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the People蒺s
Republic of China, adopted at the 3rd Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National
People蒺s Congress on 26 June 1998.
Articles 3 and 4 of the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the
People蒺s Republic of China, adopted at the 3rd Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth
National People蒺s Congress on 26 June 1998.
Articles 14 of the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the People蒺s
Republic of China, adopted at the 3rd Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National
People蒺s Congress on 26 June 1998.
The English version of China蒺s diplomatic note, CML / 17 / 2009, at http: / / www. un. org / Depts /
los / clcs_new / submissions_files / mysvnm33_09 / chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e. pdf, 10 December
2012.
The English version of China蒺s diplomatic note, CML / 8 / 2011, at http: / / www. un. org / Depts /
los / clcs_new / submissions_files / mysvnm33_09 / chn_2011_re_phl_e. pdf, 10 December 2012.
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notes, and domestic laws, it is clear that China claims sovereignty over all of the
islands that are situated in the area encircled by the 9-dashed line in the South China
Sea. This claim includes sovereignty over the territorial sea that is measured from the
straight baselines of its island territory located in the South China Sea. In addition,
China claims “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving
and managing the natural resources, whether living or non鄄living, of the waters su鄄
perjacent to the sea鄄bed and of the sea鄄bed and its subsoil, and with regard to other
activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the pro鄄
duction of energy from the water, currents and winds冶淤 and jurisdiction with regard
to the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures, marine
scientific research, and the protection and preservation of the marine environment in
its EEZs and continental shelves that are drawn 200-nautical-mile seaward from the
straight baselines of the islands located in the South China Sea. 于 Foreign aircraft and
military vessels, before entering China蒺s territorial sea, must obtain permission or no鄄
tify the Chinese authority in advance. 盂 Foreign aircraft and vessels enjoy non鄄military
related freedom of navigation and overflight in China蒺s EEZ in the South China
Sea. 榆
Commenting on the 1958 Chinese Declaration on Territorial Sea, Marwyn S.
Samuels wrote in 1982 that:
In conjunction with the Chinese claim to the islands themselves, the use of the
straight base鄄line method defined the adjacent water boundary of each archipelago
at the 12-mile limit. What is more, the straight base鄄line method, if applied to






In accordance with Article 56 (Rights, jurisdiction, and duties of the coastal State in the exclu鄄
sive economic zone) and Article 77 (Rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf) of
the LOS Convention.
Articles 3 & 4 of the PRC EEZ Law.
Article 6 of the PRC Territorial Sea Law provides that “Foreign ships for military purposes shall
be subject to approval by the Government of the People蒺s Republic of China for entering the ter鄄
ritorial sea of the People蒺s Republic of China. 冶
Article 11 of the PRC EEZ Law provides that “Any State, provided that it observes international
law and the laws and regulations of the People蒺s Republic of China, shall enjoy in the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf of the People蒺s Republic of China freedom of navigation
and overflight and of laying submarine cables and pipelines, and shall enjoy other legal and
practical marine benefits associated with these freedoms. The laying of submarine cables and
pipelines must be authorized by the competent authorities of the People蒺s Republic of China. 冶
South China Sea within China蒺s territorial sea. 淤
In July 2009, at a U. S. Senate hearing, Peter Dutton stated that “Since all of
the islands in the South China Sea are claimed as Chinese territory and included in
the baselines section of the 1992 [PRC] Territorial Sea Law, the effect of the 1998
[PRC EEZ] law is to claim an exclusive economic zone around of them. In combina鄄
tion, therefore, the two Chinese laws effectively claim a Chinese EEZ covering nearly
the entire South China Sea. 冶于
The maritime claims in the South China Sea have given rise to jurisdictional dis鄄
putes between China and several Member States of ASEAN, in particular, those
countries that are involved with sovereignty and maritime disputes over the Paracel
and Spratly Islands. Since May 2009, claims and counter鄄claims have been made,
together with actions and counter鄄actions taken, by the countries concerned in the
South China Sea, which, as a result, lead to rising tension in the region. Recent de鄄
velopments concerning sovereignty and maritime disputes in the region have also
brought several Member States of ASEAN together in opposition to the Chinese mari鄄
time claims and turning to the United States for checking China蒺s moves in the South
China Sea.
芋. Recent Developments Concerning Sovereign Rights
and Jurisdictional Disputes in the South China Sea
摇 摇 China considers that the joint submission by Malaysia and Vietnam,盂 and the
submission by Vietnam,榆 to the CLCS concerning the outer limits of the continental
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in the southern and northern parts of the South China
Sea on 6 May 2009 and 7 May 2009, respectively, have seriously infringed its sover鄄
eignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the South China Sea and therefore asked
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Marwyn S. Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, New York / London: Methuen, 1982, p.
87.
Prepared statement of Peter Dutton, Associate Professor, China Maritime Studies Institute, U.
S. Naval War College, Washington, DC, Maritime Disputes and Sovereignty Issues in East A鄄
sia, Hearing before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 111 th Congress, 1 st Session, 15 July 2009, p. 21.
The joint submission, at http: / / www. un. org / Depts / los / clcs_new / submissions_files / submis鄄
sion_mysvnm_33_2009. htm, 10 December 2012.
At http: / / www. un. org / Depts / los / clcs _new / submissions _ files / submission _ vnm_37 _2009.
htm, 10 December 2012.
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the CLCS not to consider the submissions. 淤 On 8 May 2009, Vietnam responded to
the Chinese diplomatic notes by stating that “China蒺s claim over the islands and adja鄄
cent waters in the Eastern Sea (South China Sea) as manifested in the map attached
with the Notes Verbale CLM / 17 / 2009 and CLM / 18 / 2009 has no legal, historical or
factual basis, therefore is null and void. 冶于 Malaysia responded to the Chinese note
by arguing that the joint submission “constitute[s] legitimate undertakings in imple鄄
mentation of the obligations of State Parties to the [LOS Convention], which conform
to the pertinent provisions of [the LOS Convention] as well as the Rules of Procedure
of the [CLCS]. 冶盂
In its response to the Chinese note, especially the attached “ nine鄄dotted鄄lines
map冶, Indonesia argued that “those remote or very small features in the South China
Sea do not deserve exclusive economic zone or continental shelf of their own,冶榆 and
that the map “clearly lacks international legal basis and is tantamount to upset[ting]
the [LOS Convention]. 冶 Indonesia pointed out that “Allowing the use of uninhabited
rocks, reefs and atolls isolated from the mainland and in the middle of the high sea as
a basepoint to generate maritime space concerns the fundamental principles of the
Convention and encroaches [ upon] the legitimate interest of the global communi鄄
ty. 冶虞 The Indonesian response to the Chinese maritime claim was followed by a dip鄄
lomatic note sent by the Philippines to the Secretary鄄General of the United Nations on
5 April 2011, in which the Philippines reaffirmed its sovereignty and jurisdiction over
the geological features in the Kalayaan Island Group, which encompasses 53 islands,
reefs, shoals cays, rocks and atolls of the Spratly archipelago, and challenged the le鄄
gitimacy of the Chinese claim to sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the
islands, “adjacent waters冶, “relevant waters冶, and seabed and subsoil encircled by








China, Note CML / 17 / 2009, 7 May 2009, and China, Note CML / 18 / 2009, 7 May 2009, at
http: / / www. un. org / Depts / los / clcs_new / submissions_files / mysvnm33_09 / chn_2009re_mys_
vnm_e. pdf and http: / / www. un. org / Depts / los / clcs_new / submissions_files / vnm37_09 / chn_
2009re_vnm. pdf, 10 December 2012.
Vietnam, Note No. 86 / HC-2009, 8 May 2009, at http: / / www. un. org / Depts / los / clcs_new /
submissions_files / vnm37_09 / vnm_re_chn_2009re_vnm. pdf, 10 December 2012.
Malaysia, Note HA 24 / 09, 20 May 2009, at http: / / www. un. org / Depts / los / clcs_new / sub鄄
missions_files / mysvnm33_09 / mys_re_chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e. pdf, 10 December 2012.
Indonesia, Note No. 480 / POL-703 / VII / 10, 8 July 2010, at http: / / www. un. org / Depts / los /
clcs_new / submissions_files / mysvnm33_09 / idn_2010re_mys_vnm_e. pdf, 10 December 2012.
Indonesia, Note No. 480 / POL-703 / VII / 10, 8 July 2010, at http: / / www. un. org / Depts / los /
clcs_new / submissions_files / mysvnm33_09 / idn_2010re_mys_vnm_e. pdf, 10 December 2012.
The Philippines, Note 11-00494, No. 000228, 5 April 2011, at http: / / www. un. org / Depts /
los / clcs_new / submissions_files / mysvnm33_09 / phl_re_chn_2011. pdf, 10 December 2012.
If China is indeed claiming all the waters encircled by the nine鄄dotted鄄line as in鄄
ternal or territorial waters, it would certainly be very difficult to justify the claim un鄄
der international law, including the LOS Convention. Based on the diplomatic notes
sent by the Chinese government to the United Nations, it is clear that China does not
make such a claim. However, if China is only claiming sovereignty over the islands
and the maritime zones inside the nine鄄dashed鄄line in the South China Sea that can
be generated from the Pratas Islands, Paracel Islands, and Spratly Islands, including
the territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf, it would not be contrary to the LOS
Convention. The real challenge for this position is the application and interpretation
of Article 121 (3) of the LOS Convention, which provides that “Rocks which cannot
sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive eco鄄
nomic zone or continental shelf. 冶淤
On 14 April 2011, as mentioned earlier, China claims that under the relevant
provisions of the LOS Convention, the 1992 PRC Territorial Sea Law, and the 1998
PRC EEZ Law, the Spratly Islands are fully entitled to territorial sea, EEZ, and con鄄
tinental shelf. 于 This implies that China is taking a liberal position in interpreting the
application of Article 121 (3) of the LOS Convention. In addition, it can be derived
from this position that the Pratas Islands and Paracel Islands can also have EEZ and
continental shelf, in addition to the territorial sea. On 3 May 2011, Vietnam respon鄄
ded to the Chinese claim, by reasserting that “Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa
(Spratly) Archipelagos are integral parts of Vietnamese territory. 冶盂 Vietnam argued
that it “has sufficient historical evidences and legal foundation to assert her sovereign鄄
ty over these two archipelagos. 冶榆
Since 2009, a series of law enforcement actions have been taken by China to
demonstrate that it has jurisdiction over the South China Sea, in particular in the area
encircled by the nine鄄dashed line. In March 2009, for example, China sent its lar鄄
gest fishery patrol ship, Yuzheng 311, to the Spratly Islands to enhance the fishery
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protection and maritime surveillance efforts in the South China Sea. 淤 In May 2009,
China announced a moratorium on fishing in the South China Sea (from the 12 th par鄄
allel north of the Spratly Islands up to the Chinese coast) from 16 May to 1 August.
The aim of the moratorium is to preserve fish stocks, prevent illegal fishing, and as鄄
sert China蒺s sovereign right within its EEZ in the South China Sea.
China launches the moratorium on fishing in the South China Sea annually,
which gives rise to jurisdictional disputes, in particular, between China and Viet鄄
nam, in the waters surrounding the Paracel and Spratly Islands. China claims an
EEZ covering much of the South China Sea, including the Paracel and Spratly Islands
and therefore has jurisdiction over management and conservation of fisheries resources
in the area. Over the past three years, China has continuously implemented its fish鄄
ing ban in the South China Sea and seized Vietnamese fishing boats in waters near the
Paracel Islands all year around because of their violation of China蒺s EEZ and fishery
laws. 于
Law enforcement actions have also been taken by China to support its claim to
EEZ in the area west of Palawan in the disputed Spratly Islands of the South China
Sea. In February 2011, three Philippines fishing boats, when operating in the waters
off Jackson Atoll, 140 nautical miles west of Palawan, received the following warning




China蒺s Largest Fishery Patrol Ship Starts Mission, Xinhua News, at http: / / news. xinhuanet.
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ately. 冶淤 The Philippines claims that Jackson Atoll is within its 200-nautical-mile
EEZ and belongs to the Kalayaan Island Group which, under the Philippines蒺 law, is
part of the country蒺s regime of islands. 于 In October 2011, in response to the action
taken by a Philippine naval vessel against a Chinese fishing vessel that was towing 25
dinghies and operating in the waters off Reed Bank (Liyue Bank) of the Spratly ar鄄
chipelago, China蒺s foreign ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu stated that:
China enjoys indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha [Spralty] Islands and their
adjacent waters. It is completely justified for Chinese fishermen to fish in an area
that has been a traditional fishing ground for generations. The actions taken by
the Philippines have harmed the lawful rights and interests of Chinese fishermen.
China has expressed its position to the Philippines, urging it to unconditionally re鄄
turn the Chinese dinghies as soon as possible and appropriately handle relevant is鄄
sues. 盂
The Philippines rejected China蒺s demand for the return of the seized fishing
boats, claiming that the dinghies were spotted in the Reed Bank near Palawan, which
is within the Philippines蒺 waters and is not disputed. 榆
China and Malaysia were also at odds over fishing right in the waters near Pulau
Layang Layang (Swallow Reef), which is one of the features in the Spratly Islands,
but has been under Malaysia蒺s control since the late 1970s. In April 2010, consider鄄
ing the waters around Layang Layang island its EEZ, China responded to the action
taken by the Malaysian navy against its fishing boats by dispatching escort vessels to
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the disputed area. 淤 Jurisdictional disputes between China and Indonesia were also re鄄
ported. In June 2010, during a stand鄄off over the Indonesian navy蒺s seizure of a Chi鄄
nese fishing boat that was operating in the waters north of Natuna Islands, a Chinese
“fishery management vessel冶 pointed its large鄄caliber machine gun at the carbon鄄
hulled Indonesian craft, demanding for the release of the detained Chinese fishing
boat. A similar episode occurred in May 2010. 于 The confrontation between China
and Indonesia occurred in the area that is encircled by the nine鄄dashed line in the
South China Sea, which is claimed by China as its EEZ and where its fishermen are
entitled to operate.
In addition to the disputes over the right to explore, exploit, conserve, and
manage fisheries resources, since March 2011, there have been seen a new round of
conflicts in the waters around the Paracel and Spratly Islands over the right to develop
oil and gas resources. The disputes are found in the areas encircled by China蒺s nine鄄
dashed line in the South China Sea.
In March 2011, two Chinese marine surveillance vessels ordered MV Veritas
Voyager, a Forum Energy Plc ( FEP) survey vessel operating at the Reed Bank,
which is near the Spratly archipelago, to leave. The survey ship was chartered by
FEP, a UK鄄based oil and gas company, which had been awarded a contract by the
government of the Philippines to conduct seismic studies in the Sampaguita gas field
located in the Reed Bank basin in the South China Sea. The government of the Phil鄄
ippines lodged a protest against the Chinese action. 盂 In May and June 2011, Chinese
vessels were spotted in the area near Bombay Shoal, Reed Bank and Amy Douglas
Bank, reportedly unloading building materials, erecting posts, installing plastic bu鄄





Koichi Furuya, Kazuto Tsukamoto and Yoichi Kato, China Ratcheting up Regional Tension,
Asahi Shimbun, at http: / / www. asahi. com / english / TKY201007230527. html, 10 December
2012.
Kelley Currie, Why Is China Picking Fights with Indonesia?, The Weekly Standard, at http: / /
www. weeklystandard. com / blogs / why-china-picking- fights- indonesia, 10 December 2012.
See also Is China A Neighbor to Indonesia, The Jakarta Post, at http: / / www. thejakartapost.
com / news / 2011 / 08 / 08 / is-china-a-neighbor-indonesia. html, 10 December 2012.
Ian Storey, China and the Philippines: Implications of the Reed Bank Incident, China Brief,
Vol. 11, Issue 8, 6 May 2011, pp. 6 ~ 8, at http: / / www. jamestown. org / uploads / media / cb_
11_8_03. pdf, 10 December 2012.
areas in the South China Sea. 淤 In response to the Chinese drilling plan, Lt. Gen.
Juancho Sabban, who is chief of the Philippines蒺 Western Command, asked Filipino
fishermen to be ready to use their boats to block the operation of the Chinese mega oil
rig should it show up off the coast of Palawan in the Spratly archipelago. 于 On 4 July
2011, the Chinese Embassy delivered a protest to the government of the Philippines
after Manila invited foreign companies to bid for the right to explore oil and gas in 15
areas northwest of Palawan, claiming that the areas fall under China蒺s “ indisputable
sovereignty. 冶盂
Actions have also been taken by China to support its claim to sovereign right for
the exploration and exploitation of non鄄living resources in the waters encircled by the
nine鄄dashed line in the South China Sea. In May 2011, a Chinese marine surveil鄄
lance vessel cut exploration cables of the Binh Minh 02 of the Vietnam National Oil
and Gas Corporation that was operating in a contracted area called Block 148, which
is located about 120 km (80 miles) off the south鄄central coast of Vietnam from the
beach town of Nha Trang, and some 600 km (370 miles) south of China蒺s Hainan is鄄
land. 榆 This was followed by another cable cutting incident that occurred in the con鄄
tracted area called Block 136-03 in the vicinity of Vanguard Bank, which is one of
the features in the Spratly archipelago, in June 2011. The government of Vietnam in鄄
terpreted the incidents as a Chinese plan to make its nine鄄dashed line claim in the
South China Sea a reality. 虞 In October 2011, in response to an oil and gas explora鄄
tion agreement signed between Vietnam and India in the disputed waters of the South
China Sea, China蒺s ministry of foreign affairs stated that “Our position and relevant
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claim … are consistent and clear. We … hope all relevant parties contribute more to
the peace and stability of the South China Sea. 冶淤 On 26 October 2011, it was repor鄄
ted that the gas discovery of American oil major ExxonMobil off the coast of Vietnam
in an area of the South China Sea that is also claimed by China is to add tension in
the disputed waters between Beijing and Hanoi. 于
Recent incidents between China and the four Member States of ASEAN in the
South China Sea since May 2009 suggest that China might be more consistently exer鄄
ting its power to support its claims to the natural resources, both living and non鄄liv鄄
ing, in the area encircled by the nine鄄dashed line. Accordingly it can also be expec鄄
ted to see an increase of jurisdictional disputes in the South China Sea in the years to
come.
郁. U. S. Interests and Policy in the South China Sea
Traced back to 1988, when tension in the South China Sea was escalated into
armed conflict between China and Vietnam over the Spratly Islands, the Regan ad鄄
ministration responded by stating that while the United States took no position on the
merits of competing claims in the South China Sea, it supported a peaceful resolution
of the disputes and opposed the threat or use of force by the claimants. 盂 In May
1995, concerned about the conflict between China and the Philippines over ownership
of Mischief Reef, the Clinton administration issued “ the most comprehensive state鄄
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est in the maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea冶淤 and the Unit鄄
ed States “view[s] with serious concern any maritime claim, or restriction on mari鄄
time activity, in the South China Sea that was not consistent with international law,
including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 冶于
More recently, the U. S. interests in the South China Sea were made clear in the
remarks by former Defense Secretary Robert Gates at the Shangri鄄La security dialogue
meeting held in Singapore in June 2010, when the Secretary stated that “ the South
China Sea is an area of growing concern. This sea is not only vital to those directly
bordering it, but to all nations with economic and security interests in Asia. 冶盂 Due
to its commitments to (1) free and open commerce, (2) a just international order
that emphasizes rights and responsibilities of nations and fidelity to the rule of law,
(3) open access by all to the global commons of sea, air, space, and cyberspace,
and (4) the principle of resolving conflict without the use of force, it is U. S. inter鄄
ests and policy that stability, freedom of navigation, and free and unhindered eco鄄
nomic development in the South China Sea should be maintained, that while not tak鄄
ing sides on any competing sovereignty claims in the area, the United States opposes
the use of force and actions that hinder freedom of navigation, and that the United
States objects to any effort to intimidate U. S. corporations or those of any nation en鄄
gaged in legitimate economic activity. 榆
The U. S. interests in the South China Sea were further elaborated by Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton when attending the 17 th ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi,
Vietnam in July 2010, where she stated that the United States, “ like every nation,
has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia蒺s maritime com鄄
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mons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea. 冶淤 In addition, the
Secretary made it clear that although the United States does not take sides on the sov鄄
ereignty and maritime disputes over the islands in the South China Sea, “claimants
should pursue their territorial claims and accompanying rights to maritime space in
accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 冶于
U. S. interests in the South China Sea were reiterated in a letter sent by the U.
S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry and Senator John Mc鄄
Cain to Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo on 14 July 2011, in which the senators
wrote: “the United States does not take a position on the overlapping territorial claims
in this region, but we do maintain a deep and abiding interest in ensuring freedom of
navigation, commerce, and economic exploration; maintaining U. S. commitments to
our allies and partners; and supporting peace and security in the Asia鄄Pacific re鄄
gion. 冶盂 The two senators also expressed the U. S. concern about a series of naval in鄄
cidents that occurred in the South China Sea and raised tensions in the region, and
warned that “[i]f appropriate steps are not taken to calm the situation, future inci鄄
dents could escalate, jeopardizing the vital national interest of the United States. 冶榆
On 22 July 2011, Secretary Clinton, when attending the 18 th ASEAN Regional
Forum held in Bali, Indonesia, stated that “as a Pacific nation and resident power we
have a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia蒺s maritime do鄄
main, the maintenance of peace and stability and respect for international law in the
South China Sea. 冶虞 She urged all parties involved in sovereignty and maritime dis鄄
putes in the South China Sea to pursue their territorial claims and accompanying
rights to maritime space in accordance with international law, particularly as reflected
in the LOS Convention. 愚 She also expressed the U. S. concern about a number of na鄄
val incidents in the South China Sea that threaten peace and stability in the Asia鄄Pa鄄
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undermine freedom of navigation, and pose risks to lawful unimpeded commerce and
economic development. 冶淤 In addition, the Secretary asked all of the parties con鄄
cerned to clarify their claims in the South China Sea in terms consistent with customa鄄
ry international law, particularly as reflected in the LOS Convention. “Consistent with
international law, claims to maritime space in the South China Sea should be derived
solely from legitimate claims to land features冶,于 she added. On 24 July 2011, in her
remarks made at APGWV Soundbite, Nusa Dua, Indonesia, Secretary Clinton stated
that:
The United States takes no position on any claim made by any party to any dispu鄄
ted area. What we want to see is a resolution process that will be aided by the code
of conduct that ASEAN is working toward, based on the Declaration of Conduct,
and that the principles of international law will govern so that there can be peace鄄
ful resolution of all the claims. In order to achieve that, every claimant must
make their claim publicly and specifically known so that we know where there is
any dispute.
All of us have a stake in ensuring that these disputes don蒺t get out of control,
and in fact the numbers have been increasing of intimidation actions, of ram鄄
ming, of cutting of cables, the kind of things that will raise the cost of doing bus鄄
iness for everyone who travels through the South China Sea, which … is half of
all global commerce. 盂
In October 2011, during his visit to Indonesia, U. S. Defense Secretary Leon
Panetta asked the Member States of ASEAN to continue working towards a binding
code of conduct. He reiterated that the United States has a national interest in free鄄
dom of navigation and overflight, in unimpeded economic development and com鄄
mence, and in respect for international law. In addition, he said, although the Unit鄄
ed States does not take a position on competing territorial claims, it hopes that in the
interest of peaceful resolution, all parties concerned need to clarify their maritime
claims in terms consistent with customary international law, as reflected in the LOS
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Convention. 淤 This was followed by a number of remarks made by Secretary Clinton in
Manila, Philippines on 16 November 2011, which included: (1) President Obama,
when attending the 3 rd U. S. -ASEAN Leaders Meeting and the 6 th East Asia Summit,
would reaffirm U. S. national interest in the maintenance of peace and security in the
South East Asia and internationally; (2) the U. S. national interest includes “ free鄄
dom of navigation, overflight, respect for international law, the rule of law, unim鄄
peded lawful commerce across the region蒺s maritime domain;冶 and (3) the United
States will “ further seek to see the Law of the Sea used as the overriding framework
for handling territorial disputes. 冶于 Secretary Clinton, in a response to a question
raised by a reporter, raised the LOS Convention in the context of the South China Sea
disputes. She said,
the disputes … in the West Philippine Sea [South China Sea] between the Philip鄄
pines and China should be resolved peacefully. The United States does not take a
position on any territorial claim, because any nation with a claim has a right to
assert it, but they do not have a right to pursue it through intimidation or coer鄄
cion. They should be following international law, the rule of law, the UN Con鄄
vention on Law of the Seas … There are mechanisms within it … for the resolution
of disputes. And we stand for the rule of law and we stand for international norms
and standards, which is why we support the peaceful resolution. 盂
The most recent statement on U. S. interests and policy in the South China Sea
was made by President Obama at the 6 th East Asia Summit held in Bali, Indonesia on
19 November 2011, where he enunciated the principles鄄based U. S. approach to mar鄄
itime security issues in the region, including freedom of navigation and overflight and
other internationally lawful uses of the seas, as well as use of collaborative diplomatic
processes to address the South China Sea disputes. He also stated that the United
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or maritime claims or interfere in legitimate economic activity. In addition, President
Obama reiterated U. S. support for the 2002 ASEAN鄄China Declaration of the Con鄄
duct of Parties in the South China Sea as a responsible approach to disputed areas,
and encouraged all parties concerned to accelerate efforts to reach a full Code of Con鄄
duct for the South China Sea. 淤
U. S. interests in the South China Sea and concerns about rising tensions in the
region can also be found in a number of U. S. Congressional resolutions introduced in
2011. On 13 June 2011, Senator Jim Webb (D-VA), chair of the Senate Foreign
Relations East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee introduced resolution 217,
calling for a peaceful and multilateral resolution to maritime territorial disputes in
Southeast Asia, along with subcommittee ranking member James Inhofe (R-OK). 于
The resolution, approved by the U. S. Senate on 27 June 2011, supports the continu鄄
ation of operations by the U. S. military in support of freedom of navigation rights in
international waters and air space in the South China Sea. On 15 July 2011, resolu鄄
tion 352 was introduced by Representative Ileana Ros鄄Lehtinen, calling for a peaceful
and collaborative resolution of maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
This resolution, referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Commit鄄
tee on Armed Services, condemns the use of force by the Chinese naval, maritime se鄄
curity, and fishing vessels in the South China Sea. 盂
The discussion in part three of this paper suggests that it is likely to see more as鄄
sertive actions to be taken by China in support of its sovereignty and maritime claims
in the area of the South China Sea that is encircled by the nine鄄dashed line. As a re鄄
sult, it is possible to see more conflicts between China and its neighboring countries
in the region, in particular, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, o鄄
ver exploitation of natural resources in the disputed waters of the South China Sea. In
conjunction with these development trends, it is noted that the importance of U. S.
interests in the South China Sea and the concern over peace and stability in the region
have also been increasing over the past two years. Accordingly, it is safe to suggest
that sovereignty and maritime disputes in the South China Sea will become a source of
conflict in the future development of Sino鄄American relations. Both China and the U鄄
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nited States will interpret and apply rules of international law as reflected in the LOS
Convention in accordance with their perspective national interests, which are likely to
give rise to possible disputes, in particular, in the area of the South China Sea,
which is encircled by the nine鄄dashed line and claimed as China蒺s EEZ in the Paracel
and Spratly Islands.
吁. Potential Sino鄄American Jurisdictional Disputes
in the South China Sea
摇 摇 Potential jurisdictional disputes between China and the United States in the wa鄄
ters around the Paracel and Spratly Islands of the South China Sea are closely related
to the interpretation and application of a number of provisions of the LOS Convention,
which include, but not limited to, Article 7 (Straight baselines), Article 17 (Right
of innocent passage), Article 20 (Submarines and other underwater vehicles), Arti鄄
cle 47 (Archipelagic baselines), Article 58 (Rights and duties of other States in the
exclusive economic zone), Article 60 (Artificial islands, installations and structures
in the exclusive economic zone), Article 121 (Regime of islands), and Article 301
(Peaceful uses of the seas). Among these provisions, however, it is this author蒺s
view that the interpretation and application of Article 58 and Article 121 will have the
biggest potential to give rise to legal disputes between Beijing and Washington, in
particular, in the context of China蒺s EEZ claim in the South China Sea, which is re鄄
flected in its diplomatic notes sent to the Secretary鄄General of the United Nations in
May 2009 and April 2011, respectively.
China is a party to the LOS Convention and therefore bound by the provisions of
the treaty. The United States is not a party to the LOS Convention, but proclaimed a
12-nautical-mile territorial sea in 1988,淤 a 24 -nautical-mile contiguous zone in
1999,于 and a 200-nautical-mile EEZ in 1983. 盂 When proclaiming the establish鄄
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within 200 nautical miles off its coast, President Reagan stated that “ the United
States will recognize the rights of other states in the waters off their coasts, as reflec鄄
ted in the [LOS] Convention, so long as the rights and freedoms of the United States
and others under international law are recognized by such coastal States. 冶淤 In addi鄄
tion, the President stated that “the United States will exercise and assert its naviga鄄
tion and overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is con鄄
sistent with the balance of interests reflected in the convention. The United States will
not, however, acquiesce in unilateral acts of other States designed to restrict the
rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight and
other related high seas uses. 冶于 Since 1983, it has been the U. S. position that with鄄
in the EEZ, all States enjoy the high seas freedoms of navigation, overflight, the lay鄄
ing of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the
sea. 盂
Article 58, paragraph 1, of the LOS Convention provides that:
In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land鄄locked, enjoy,
subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in ar鄄
ticle 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and
pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these free鄄
doms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine
cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention.
The U. S. interpretation of this article can be found in one of the understandings
that were included in the Senate Resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the
LOS Convention drafted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 2004
and December 2007, respectively, which states that:
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All States enjoy high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight and all other in鄄
ternationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, including, inter
alia, military activities, such as anchoring, launching and landing of aircraft
and craft, operating military devices, intelligence collection, surveillance and re鄄
connaissance activities, exercises, operations, and conducting military surveys. 淤
The U. S. position on the interpretation and application of Article 58 is also re鄄
flected in U. S. response to the call for adopting the guidelines for navigation and o鄄
verflight in the EEZ of foreign coastal States,于 which were the product of a series of
meetings on the Regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone: Issues and Responses, held
from 2003 to 2005 and attended by members of EEZ Group 21, including about 14 o鄄
cean law and policy scholars from Japan, Australia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Chi鄄
na, South Korea, Vietnam, India, and a judge from the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea. 盂 The guidelines were adopted for the purpose of dealing with the in鄄
creasing frequency and intensity of incidents involving foreign military vessels and air鄄
craft in EEZs of the countries in the East Asian seas, such as the 2001 EP-3 and
2002 Bowditch incidents. 榆 The United States refused to consider accepting the guide鄄
lines mainly because of its position that “all States enjoy high seas freedoms of navi鄄
gation and overflight and all other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to
these freedoms,冶 including military exercises, hydrographic and military survey, and
intelligence gathering. China does not accept the U. S. claim, arguing that “most
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tries generally hold that naval and air force military reconnaissance activities in EEZs
must be conducted with the agreement of littoral States. 冶淤
China is also taking a position that military鄄related freedom of navigation and
military鄄related activities in its EEZs are not allowed under international law, in par鄄
ticular, the LOS Convention, because they are not considered “peaceful冶 uses of the
sea. Article 301 of the Convention provides that:
In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention, States
Parties shall refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.
It is China蒺s view that the U. S. military鄄related activities conducted in the
Yellow Sea, the East China Sea or the South China Sea are in violation of the LOS
Convention, because the U. S. military鄄related activities targeted at China, threat鄄
ened its national security, and therefore are not for peaceful purposes. However, it is
the U. S. position that nothing in the LOS Convention, including any provisions refer鄄
ring to the wording “peaceful uses冶 or “peaceful purposes,冶于 impairs the inherent
right of individual or collective self鄄defense, or rights during armed conflict. 盂 This
position corresponds with the U. S. position taken in 1976 during the fourth session of
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, at which an American
delegate declared:
The term “peaceful purposes冶 did not, of course, preclude military activities gen鄄
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The wording can be found in the Preamble, Articles 141, 143(1), 147(2)(d), 155(2), 240
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erally. The United States had consistently held that the conduct of military activi鄄
ties for peaceful purposes was in full accord with the Charter of the United Nations
and with the principles of international law. Any specific limitation on military
activities would require the negotiation of a detailed arms control agreement. 淤
In addition, under Article 58, paragraph 3, of the Convention, the United
States, in exercising her rights in China蒺s EEZ, as China argues, must have due re鄄
gard to the rights of China and should comply with the Chinese laws and regulations
that are adopted in accordance with the provisions of the LOS Convention and other
rules of international law in so far as they are not inconsistent with the relevant provi鄄
sions contained in Part V of the Convention. Article 11 of the PRC EEZ Law provides
that any State can enjoy freedom of navigation and overflight, as well as other legal
and practical marine benefits in China蒺s EEZ, provided that it observes international
law and the Chinese laws and regulations.
The differences over the interpretation and application of Article 58 between Chi鄄
na and the United States are clearly manifested in the legal arguments made by the
two parties in the 2001 EP-3 and 2009 Impeccable incidents. 于 However, the loca鄄
tions where the two incidents occurred are in China蒺s EEZ that extends to a distance
200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth of Hainan Island蒺s terri鄄
torial sea is measured in accordance with the straight baseline system that China an鄄
nounced in May 1996. They are not within the Chinese EEZ claimed for the Paracel
Islands or the Spratly Islands. What if the United States conducts military鄄related ac鄄
tivities in the “relevant waters冶 of the Paracel Islands or the Spratly Islands, such as
holding military exercises with the Philippines or Vietnam, conducting hydrographic
surveys, or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions in the disputed
waters or in the air above the waters encircled by the nine鄄dashed line in the Spratly
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the United States respond to China蒺s actions taken as Beijing did in the EP-3 and Im鄄
peccable incidents?
On 29 June 2011, a People蒺s Liberation Army Air Force J-11 crossed the center
line of the Taiwan Strait in an attempted intercept of a U. S. Air Force U-2 recon鄄
naissance aircraft conducting a monitoring mission in international airspace. 淤 In re鄄
sponse, the chairman of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, stated
at a press conference held in July 2011 that the reconnaissance flight is important and
the United States “won蒺t be deterred from flying in international airspace. 冶于 In July
2011, the Philippines Foreign Affairs Secretary warned that freedom of navigation in
the South China Sea is facing a potential threat, “if China continues to claim owner鄄
ship of the entire sea. 冶盂 This was followed by a report on 31 August 2011 that a Chi鄄
nese warship confronted an Indian navy vessel shortly after it left a Vietnamese port in
late July in the South China Sea. The unidentified Chinese warship demanded that
India蒺s INS Airavat, an amphibious assault vessel, identify itself and explain its pres鄄
ence in what it said were Chinese waters in the region. 榆 On 1 September 2011, the
Ministry of External Affairs responded to the report by issuing a statement, in which it
said, “there was no confrontation involving INS Airavat. 冶虞 At the same time, how鄄
ever, the ministry stated that “ India supports freedom of navigation in international
waters, including in the South China Sea, and the right of passage in accordance with
accepted principles of international law. These principles should be respected by
all. 冶愚
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At least since the adoption of the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the
South China Sea in November 2002,淤 China has repeatedly stated that the freedom of
navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea will be respected. On 22 July
2011, during his attendance of foreign ministers蒺 meetings of ASEAN Regional Forum
in Bali, Indonesia, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi told U. S. Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton that the freedom of navigation and security in the South China
Sea is not under threat, and that China is always committed to maintaining the free鄄
dom of navigation and security in the South China Sea. 于 At the 18 th ARF (ASEAN
Regional Forum), Yang reiterated China蒺s position on the freedom of Navigation in
the South China Sea. He said, “Freedom of navigation is in the interests of China as
well as other countries. The importance of freedom of navigation and safety in the
South China Sea is self鄄evident. Freedom of navigation is not impeded, and should
not be allowed to be impeded in the future. 冶盂
Despite the reiterated assurance from China, there has been seen an increasing
concern about the threat to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea since July
2011. On 15 September 2011, the United States and Australia jointly called for un鄄
impeded freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. 榆 Four days later, U. S. Sec鄄
retary of State Hillary Clinton and Japanese Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba dis鄄
cussed the importance of, and the need to have freedom of navigation in the South
China Sea when they met in New York on sidelines of the 66 th session of the U. N.
General Assembly. 虞 On 4 November 2011, India蒺s defense minister A. K. Antony
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ternational waters, including in the South China Sea. 淤
At the 6 th East Asia Summit (EAS), 16 of the 18 participating national leaders
raised the South China Sea, particularly expressing their concerns about freedom of
navigation and overflight in the region. 于 The concern was incorporated into the De鄄
claration of the East Asia Summit on the Principles for Mutually Beneficial Relations
that was adopted at the end of the summit on 19 November 2011. The 18 participat鄄
ing leaders盂 recognized that “the international law of the sea contains norms that con鄄
tribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region冶 and declared that the
EAS participating countries are guided by a number of principles, including respect
for international law, promotion and maintenance of peace, stability, security and
prosperity, renunciation of the threat of use of force or use of force against another
State, conformity with the UN Charter, and settlement of differences and disputes by
peaceful means. 榆
In December 2010, Jerome A. Cohen and Jon M. Van Dyke predicted that the
conflicts between China and the United States in the Chinese claimed EEZ are likely
to increase. 虞 In August 2011, Robert D. Kaplan, a member of the Defense Policy
Board of the U. S. Defense Department, warned of China蒺s “undeniable naval expan鄄
sion, … forcing every country around it to react. 冶 He posited the “21
st century蒺s de鄄
fining battleground is going to be on water冶 and “the South China Sea is the future of
conflict冶 . 愚 But in China, it is widely believed that “freedom of navigation冶 is used
by the United States as an excuse in its attempt to control the South China Sea to lock
Chinese navy. 舆 Although efforts have been made by China to convince the United
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States that freedom of navigation will be respected in the South China Sea, it is likely
to see the dispute between Beijing and Washington over the interpretation and appli鄄
cation of Article 58 of the LOS Convention in the waters around the Paracel and
Spratly Islands to occur in the near future.
In addition to Article 58, it is also possible for a rise of jurisdictional disputes
between the two countries over the interpretation and application of Article 121, in
particular, its third paragraph, of the LOS Convention in the waters around the Para鄄
cel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Article 121 provides that:
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is
above water at high tide.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone,
the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined
in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land terri鄄
tory.
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own
shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia are taking the position that the Paracel and
Spratly Islands cannot “sustain human habitation冶 or do not have “economic life of
their own冶 and therefore, should be treated as “rocks冶 as defined in Article 121 (3)
of the LOS Convention, and “shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf. 冶 But apparently China disagrees. In fact, as shown in its diplomatic notes to
the U. N. Secretary鄄General on 7 May 2009 and 14 April 2011, respectively, China
claims that “China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China
Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the rel鄄
evant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof冶,淤 and that “under the rele鄄
vant provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, as well
as the Law of the People蒺s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone (1992) and the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf
of the People蒺s Republic of China (1998), China蒺s Nansha Islands [Spratly Islands]
[are] fully entitled to Territorial Sea, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Conti鄄
041
淤 The English version of China蒺s diplomatic note, CML / 17 / 2009, at http: / / www. un. org / Depts /
los / clcs_new / submissions_files / mysvnm33_09 / chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e. pdf, 10 December
2012.
nental Shelf. 冶淤 Commenting on the Malaysian and Vietnamese continental shelf sub鄄
missions done in May 2009, Sam Bateman suggested that the Vietnamese and Malay鄄
sian move was provocative, because not only did it reject any resource rights in this
part of the South China Sea to China, the Philippines, Brunei, and certainly Taiwan,
but also denied that “any of the islands of the Spratly group qualify under internation鄄
al law as the types of islands capable of generating a continental shelf or EEZ of their
own. 冶于
On 10 March 2009, the Philippines enacted an act to define its archipelagic
baseline. 盂 Section 2 of the Act provides that the Philippines蒺 exercise of sovereignty
and jurisdiction over the Kalayaan Island Group located in the Spratly Islands and Ba鄄
jo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal) located near the MacClesfield Bank of the South
China Sea should be determined as “Regime of Islands冶 consistent with Article 121
of the LOS Convention. The position taken by the Philippines is not clear regarding
whether the features enclosed by a polygon shaped line in the Spratly Islands, that is,
the Kalayaan Island Group, and Scarborough Shoal located in the area near Maccles鄄
field Bank, are considered “rocks冶 in accordance with Article 121 (3), and there鄄
fore cannot claim an EEZ and continental shelf, or are treated as “ islands冶 and
therefore have the right to do so in accordance with Article 121 (2).
On 22 September 2011, at the first ASEAN Maritime Legal Experts蒺 Meeting,
the participants discussed the Philippines proposal for a Zone of Peace, Freedom,
Friendship and Cooperation (ZoPFF / C) in the South China Sea, which aims to seg鄄
regate the disputed features from the non鄄disputed waters in the sea. In the proposal,
the Philippines explained that the South China Sea disputes are actually limited to the
features, that is, rocks, reefs, atolls, and low鄄tide elevations, in the Paracel Islands
and the Spratly Islands, and their limited adjacent waters. The waters (and continen鄄
tal shelves) beyond the disputed relevant features and their adjacent waters are not in
dispute. The disputed relevant features and their adjacent waters could be segregated
from the rest of the waters of the South China Sea by enclaving the said features. The
adjacent waters of the relevant features could be determined by applying Article 121
of the LOS Convention. Although it is true that most of the features in the Spratly
Islands are low鄄tide elevations and rocks, and therefore, in accordance with Article
141
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121 (3), cannot generate 200-nautical-mile EEZ or continental shelf, it seems that
the Philippines is taking a position that “ relevant features冶 in the Spratly Islands,
such as Taiping Dao (Itu Aba), are capable of projecting maritime zones under Arti鄄
cle 121 (2), including EEZ. 淤
The first ASEAN Maritime Legal Experts蒺 Meeting concluded that ZoPFF / C
could be taken into account by the Senior Officials蒺 Meeting (SOM) in the implemen鄄
tation of the ASEAN鄄China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China
Sea (DOC). The discussion and findings at the meeting will also be reported to the
ASEAN Senior Officials蒺 Meeting, which will then make recommendations for the
ASEAN Foreign Ministers to consider before the 19 th ASEAN Summit on 19 November
2011 in Bali, Indonesia. 于 It is therefore important to watch closely how the Member
States of ASEAN would respond to the Philippines蒺 proposal and if they would come
out with a common position on the interpretation and application of Article 121 (3) of
the LOS Convention in the Spratly Islands.
How would the United States interpret and apply Article 121 in the Paracel and
the Spratly Islands? What is the U. S. position and practice on the controversial is鄄
sue? Before answering these questions, we should take note again the remarks made
by U. S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at the 17 thand 18 th ASEAN Regional Fo鄄
rum. The Secretary urged the claimants to pursue their territorial claims and accom鄄
panying rights to maritime space in accordance with the LOS Convention and that
“Consistent with international law, claims to maritime space in the South China Sea
should be derived solely from legitimate claims to land features. 冶盂
It seems that the United States is taking a position that all islands, including
rocks, that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own, can claim
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the Japanese claim to a 200-nautical-mile EEZ and continental shelf for Okinotorish鄄
ima, which are two rocks situated 1,700 km south of Tokyo in the Western Pacific.
The size of the two rocks is no larger than king鄄size beds. 淤 In addition, the United
States did not specifically respond to the Chinese claim to maritime space in the South
China Sea, in particular, its claim to EEZ for the features in the Spratly Islands. De鄄
spite lacking U. S. official statements, Tommy Koh of Singapore wrote in September
2011 that the United States “ is concerned about the Chinese nine鄄dashed line map
and would oppose any attempt by China to assert rights to the waters enclosed by the
nine鄄dashed line. 冶于
With regard to the U. S. practice on the legal status of an island or a rock and
its right to claim maritime zones in accordance with Article 121 of the LOS Conven鄄
tion, it should be noted that the United States does claim a 200-nautical-mile EEZ
for Johnston Atoll, Palmyra Atoll-Kingman Reef, Wake Island, Jarvis Island, How鄄
land and Baker Islands. In addition, the method of straight baseline is also used to
draw the baselines from which the U. S. territorial sea is measured for the Pacific re鄄
mote islands. On 10 August 1995, the Department of State on behalf of the govern鄄
ment of the United States announced the limits of the EEZ of the United States, with鄄
in which the United States exercises its sovereign right and jurisdiction as permitted
under international law, in particular, as reflected in the 1982 LOS Convention. In
addition to the publication of notices of limits of the EEZ in U. S. Atlantic Coast and
Gulf of Mexico, Pacific Coast (Washington, Oregon, and California), Alaska, and
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands in the Caribbean Sea, no鄄
tices of limits of the EEZ for the U. S. island territory in the Central and Western Pa鄄
cific were also published. 盂
In 1988, Jon Van Dyke and the other two American legal scholars, after exami鄄
ning Northwestern Hawaiian Islands (NWHIs), which consist of 10 islands and atolls
stretching over near 1700 km, in accordance with the criteria contained in Article
121 (3) of the LOS Convention, concluded that eight of the NWHIs are “ rocks冶,
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and therefore recommended that EEZs not be created around them. 淤 For the purpose
of demonstration, this paper only examines briefly the U. S. claim to a 200-nautical
-mile EEZ for Howland and Baker Islands.
Howland Island is an uninhabited coral island situated just north of the equator
in the North Pacific Ocean, 1815 nautical miles (3361 km) southwest of Honolulu,
coordinates at 0毅48忆07义N and 176毅38忆3义W, about half way between Hawaii and Aus鄄
tralia. This island has a land area of 1郾 62 square kilometers. In 1874, the Howland
Island National Wildlife Refuge (NWR) was established by the U. S. Secretary of In鄄
terior, which was expanded in 2009 to include submerged lands out to 12 nautical
miles from the island. Howland Island has no natural fresh water resources, no indig鄄
enous inhabitants and no economic activity. Baker Island is also an uninhabited atoll
located just north of the equator in the North Pacific Ocean about 1700 nautical miles
(3100 km) southwest of Honolulu, coordinates at 0毅11忆41义N 176毅28忆46义W, about
halfway between Hawaii and Australia. The island has a land area of 1郾 24 square kil鄄
ometers and a 4郾 8 km coastline. Just like Howland Island, public entry is by special鄄
use permit only from the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and is generally restricted
to scientists and educators. In 1974, the Baker Island NWR was established, and it
was expanded in 2009. On 6 January 2009, the Pacific Remote Islands Marine Na鄄
tional Monument was established, which includes Baker Island NWR within its
boundary. Baker Island has no natural fresh water resources and no economic activi鄄
ty. The United States claims a 12 nautical鄄mile territorial sea and 200-nautical-mile
EEZ and establishes a marine national monument measured from the 12 -nautical -
mile refuge boundaries out to 50 nautical miles seawards around Baker Island. 于
In accordance with the Notice of Limits published by the U. S. Department of
State in August 1995, the seaward limit of the exclusive economic zone for Howland
and Bakers Islands is a line 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the terri鄄
torial sea is measured, except to the southeast and south of Howland and Baker




Jon M. Van Dyke, Joseph R. Morgan and Jonathan Gurish, The Exclusive Economic Zone of the
Northwestern Hawaiian Islands: When Do Uninhabited Islands Generate an EEZ?, San Diego
Law Review, Vol. 25,1988, pp. 466 ~ 482.
For detailed account, see Yann鄄huei Song, The Application of Article 121 of the Law of the Sea
Convention to the Selected Geographical Features Situated in the Pacific Ocean, Chinese Jour鄄
nal of International Law, 2010, pp. 665 ~ 667, 689 ~ 691.
connecting the 15 base points. 淤 Could this U. S. practice be cited by China in sup鄄
port of its claim to a 200-nautical-mile EEZ or continental shelf for the features in
the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands of the South China Sea? If the United
States argues that its EEZ and continental shelf claim for the remote islands located in
the Central and Western Pacific, such as Howland and Baker Islands, is consistent
with international law, in particular, as reflected in the LOS Convention, how could
China蒺s claim in the South China Sea be challenged as in violation of Article 121 of
the treaty? Can similarities or differences be drawn between some of the larger islands
located in the South China Sea, such as Yongxing Dao (Woody Island), Taiping Dao
(Itu aba), Zhongye Dao (Thitu Island) and Nanwei Dao (Spratly Island) and the
Pacific remote islands, such as Howland and Baker islands? Is it legitimate to claim
that Howland and Baker Islands, in accordance with Article 121 of the LOS Conven鄄
tion, are entitled to the right to have EEZ or continental shelf, because they involve
no sovereignty and / or maritime disputes between the United States and its neighbor鄄
ing countries? Or, because of involvement with sovereignty disputes, the features lo鄄
cated in the Spratly Islands cannot generate EEZ or continental shelf?
In sum, a different interpretation and application of Article 121 (3) of the LOS
Convention by China and the United States has the potential to give rise to jurisdic鄄
tional disputes between the two countries in the South China Sea. Other different in鄄
terpretation and application of the regulations provided for in the Convention by China
and the United States, such as the right to use the straight baseline system to draw
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淤 These points are:
1. 0毅14忆30义 N. 173毅08忆00义 W.
2. 0毅14忆32义 S. 173毅27忆28义 W.
3. 0毅43忆52义 S. 173毅45忆30义 W.
4. 1毅04忆06义 S. 174毅17忆41义 W.
5. 1毅12忆39义 S. 174毅31忆02义 W.
6. 1毅14忆52义 S. 174毅34忆48义 W.
7. 1毅52忆36义 S. 175毅34忆51义 W.
8. 1毅59忆17义 S. 175毅45忆29义 W.
9. 2毅17忆09义 S. 176毅13忆58义 W.
10. 2毅32忆51义 S. 176毅38忆59义 W.
11. 2毅40忆26义 S. 176毅51忆03义 W.
12. 2毅44忆49义 S. 176毅58忆01义 W.
13. 2毅44忆53义 S. 176毅58忆08义 W.
14. 2毅56忆33义 S. 177毅16忆43义 W.
15. 2毅58忆45义 S. 177毅26忆00义 W.
See Department of State, U. S., Public Notice 2237, Exclusive Economic Zone and Maritime
Boundaries; Notice of Limits, 10 August 1995, Federal Register, Vol. 60, No. 1163, 23 Au鄄
gust 1995, p. 43829.
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baselines for measuring their mid鄄ocean islands and the duty for submarines and other
underwater vehicles to navigate on the surface and to show their flag when they pass
through a coastal State蒺s territorial sea, are also likely to create legal problems for the
two countries in the South China Sea, but cannot be further discussed due to space
limitation of this paper.
遇. How to Manage Potential Sino-U. S. Jurisdictional
Disputes in the South China Sea
摇 摇 Both China and the United States announce that they will abide by the LOS Con鄄
vention. However, each interprets and applies the provisions of the treaty differently
in the South China Sea, based on its respective national interest and policy considera鄄
tion. Differences over interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of the
LOS Convention, as examined above, indeed have the potential to give rise to juris鄄
dictional disputes between the two countries in the region, which in turn, would af鄄
fect the development of foreign relations between Beijing and Washington. The 2001
EP-3 and 2009 Impeccable incidents demonstrate well the negative impact of the two
countries蒺 conflicting interpretation of Article 58 of the LOS convention on their politi鄄
cal and military relations. Apparently, there is a need to find ways to help avoid the
rise of jurisdictional disputes between China and the United States in the South China
Sea. But two questions can be raised: first, is it possible for the two countries to
modify their position or behavior so that the potential disputes in the area could be a鄄
voided? And second, how to manage potential Sino-U. S. jurisdictional disputes over
the interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of the LOS Convention?
In 2010, Alan M. Wachman wrote that:
For both American and Chinese strategists and statesmen, … the controversy about
what is allowable under [ the LOS Convention] is not a simple question of how
best to interpret the convention, but is the outgrowth of geostrategic competition
under conditions of a security dilemma. Both defend their positions as a matter of
641
principle. 淤
In his opinion, China deploys legal reasoning to justify actions it feels compelled
to take for the enhancement of its security. So does the United States. 于 Accordingly,
the controversy concerning the interpretation and application of the provisions con鄄
tained in the LOS Convention “may be seen as one battle in Sino-U. S. war for moral
primacy and influence over global institutions. 冶盂
It is true, as we read carefully the declarations and understandings that were at鄄
tached to the U. S. Senate resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the LOS
Convention when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported the treaty favorably
to the full Senate for a vote in March 2004 and December 2007, respectively, it is
very difficult, if not impossible, for the United States to modify its position on the in鄄
terpretation and application of the articles of the Convention, in particular, Article 58
and Article 301.
Another difficulty is that the United States, despite being a leading maritime
power and possessing the largest EEZ and one of the longest continental shelves, has
not ratified the LOS Convention. The United States蒺 call on all parties concerned in
the South China Sea, in particular, China, to handle their territorial and maritime
disputes in accordance with the LOS Convention has been weakened by its own failure
to become a party to the treaty. As a non鄄party to the Convention, the United States
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relies on customary international law to support its claims to navigation and overflight
rights. Indeed there are opponents of the treaty in the United States, who advocate
that “ there is no need to join the treaty [ the LOS Convention] because, with the
world蒺s hegemonic navy, the United States can treat the parts of the convention it
likes as customary international law, following the convention蒺s guidelines, when it
suits American interests and pursuing a unilateral course of actions when it does
not. 冶淤 Steven Groves, for example, wrote in August 2010:
For more than 200 years, the United States has successfully preserved and protec鄄
ted its navigational rights and freedoms by relying on naval operations, diplomat鄄
ic protests, and customary international law. U. S. membership in the United Na鄄
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) would not confer any mari鄄
time right or freedom that the U. S. does not already enjoy. The U. S. can best
protect its rights by maintaining a strong U. S. Navy, not by acceding to a deeply
flawed multilateral treaty. 于
However, Rear Admiral Arthur E. Brooks, Commander of the Seventeenth Coast
Guard District, U. S. Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security, holds a dif鄄
ferent view. He said, since November 1994, although the United States has contin鄄
ued to rely upon customary international law as reflected in the LOS Convention to
advance U. S. ocean policy, and while it has served well for the United States for
many years, it does not adequately protect U. S. interests because “[c]ustomary in鄄
ternational law is based on the evolving practices of States; it can and does erode over
time. 冶盂 In addition, Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret. ),
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law, is unfortunately imprecise and malleable. Treaty law, on the other hand, pro鄄
vides a solid written and precise basis for assertion of rights. 冶淤 If the United States
were a party to the LOS Convention, it would not have to base its argument on cus鄄
tomary international law to challenge China蒺s claim to a large area in the South China
Sea, he said. 于
Noting that the United States is not a party to the LOS Convention, Secretary
Clinton announced at the end of her remarks made in Hanoi when attending the 17 th
ASEAN Regional Forum in July 2010 that one of the U. S. diplomatic priorities in the
year 2011 was to secure the convention蒺s ratification in the Senate. 盂 This announce鄄
ment was followed by the Secretary蒺s comments made at the Commonwealth Club in
San Francisco in October 2010, where she stressed that the LOS Convention is one of
the most important treaties for the United States to ratify. The accession to the treaty
“ is critical to our credibility in working with nations in Southeast Asia over questions
regarding activities in the South China Sea,冶 she said. 榆 However, so far, no pro鄄
gress had been reported regarding U. S. accession to the LOS Convention. As at 20
September 2011, the Convention had 162 parties, but it is unlikely for the United
States to join the treaty any sooner. 虞 Being continuously outside of the Convention,
the United States provides China with a good reason to argue that the United States
“has no standing to impose its self鄄regarding interpretations of the regime on those
states that have ratified it. 冶愚
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Before the U. S. joining the LOS Convention, how should the potential conflicts
between China and the United States in the South China Sea be managed or avoided?
Wachman suggested that both China and the United States may consider giving up
something in exchange for self-restraint by the other. 淤 He said,
For example, Beijing could reserve what it perceives as its right to interdict foreign
vessels that did not seek prior permission for military activities within the EEZ
while allowing as a matter of sovereign courtesy those that provided advance notice
to pass unhindered. Washington could reserve what it perceives as its right to con鄄
duct military activities in the EEZ without seeking prior permission from the coast鄄
al state while agreeing as a matter of sovereign prerogative to provide prior notifi鄄
cation to the PRC. Having received advance notification, the PRC could “ shad鄄
ow冶 foreign vessels conducting military activities in the EEZ so as to evaluate bet鄄
ter what data were being gathered, and the United States could refrain from re鄄
marking on or thwarting that countermeasure. 于
In addition, the conflict could be avoided if Beijing and Washington are willing
to adapt existing international codes of conduct for encounters at sea, such as the In鄄
ternational Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (COLREGS),盂 to gov鄄
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The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (COLREGS) are published
by the International Maritime Organization ( IMO), and set out, inter alia, the “ rules of the
road冶 or navigation rules to be followed by ships and other vessels at sea in order to prevent col鄄
lisions between two or more vessels. COLREGS can also refer to the specific political line that
divides inland waterways (subject to one set of navigation rules) and coastal waterways (sub鄄
ject to international navigation rules). More information, at http: / / en. wikipedia. org / wiki / In鄄
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Mark J. Valencia suggested that perhaps China and the United States could agree
to refrain from taking provocative acts, such as stimulating, exciting, or probing the
defensive systems of the coastal State, and from collecting information in support of
the use of force against the coastal State. To achieve the goal, the two countries could
work toward a formal agreement, which contains the following points:
1. The activities of another State in the EEZ of a coastal State should not inter鄄
fere with the communications, computer, and electronic systems of the coastal State
or make broadcasts that adversely affect the defense or security of the coastal State.
2. The coastal State should not interfere with the communications, computer,
and electronic systems over the coastal State蒺s EEZ.
3. In order to make the first two points effective, States should conclude agree鄄
ments guaranteeing mutual noninterference with communications, computer, and e鄄
lectronic systems. 淤
In addition, China and the United States could use the Military Maritime Con鄄
sultative Agreement (MMCA)于 as a forum to discuss their differences of interpreta鄄
tion of the relevant provisions of the LOS Convention in the South China Sea. 盂 Geof鄄
frey Till is also holding a similar view, suggesting that “[g]iven the possible impact
of Sino鄄American strategic rivalry on the evolving South China Sea dispute, improving
the relationship between [China and the United States] and in particular on their
mil鄄mil relationship through such institutions as the Military Maritime Consultative A鄄
greement must be considered even more important. 冶榆
In conjunction with these suggestions, this author makes the following recom鄄
mendations that could be considered by the United States and China in resolving their
potential conflicts in the Paracel and Spratly Islands, that are related to the interpre鄄
tation and application of the relevant provisions of the LOS Convention:
1. It is important for the United States to increase its efforts to accede to the
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LOS Convention;
2. China needs to make special efforts to clarify its position on the interpretation
and application of Article 121 (3) in the Paracel and Spratly Islands, in particular,
in relations to the claim to EEZ and historic rights in the waters encircled by the nine鄄
dashed line in the South China Sea;
3. The United States also needs to clarify its practice regarding the right of the
Pacific remote islands to generate EEZ, as well as the use of straight baseline system
to draw their baselines;
4. China and the United States are encouraged to use the MMCA as a forum to
discuss voluntary guidelines regarding military鄄related freedom of navigation and over鄄
flight in the Chinese claimed EEZ, or expand the MMCA to establish a bilateral code
of conduct that aims to prevent incidents in the waters around the Paracel and Spratly
Islands;
5. Both China and the United States are encouraged to include the controversial
issues related to the interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of the
LOS Convention in the agenda of their bilateral dialogue meetings or mechanisms,
such as MMCA, U. S. -China Asia Pacific Consultations, U. S. -China Strategic and
Economic Dialogue, and China-U. S. defense consultations, whenever appropriate.
喻. Concluding Remarks
Jurisdictional disputes are very complicated in the South China Sea, especially
regarding the Spratly Islands and their surrounding waters. Since May 2009, sover鄄
eignty and maritime disputes have triggered tension and complexity, endangering
peace, stability and development in the region. China蒺s position on the ownership,
sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the Spratly Islands, as manifested in its diplo鄄
matic note that was sent to the U. N. Secretary鄄General on 14 April 2011, has a big
potential for giving rise to legal disputes between Beijing and Washington over the in鄄
terpretation and application of a number of provisions contained in the LOS Conven鄄
tion that govern the rights and duties of the concerned parties in the “ adjacent wa鄄
ters冶 and “relevant waters冶 of the Spratly Islands. Among them, the interpretation
and application of the two ambiguous or controversial provisions, namely, Article 58
and Article 121 (3), of the treaty are likely to become a main source of jurisdictional
disputes in the South China Sea, which are related to the Chinese claim for a 200-
nautical-mile EEZ or continental shelf and its accompanied sovereign rights and ju鄄
risdiction in the waters surrounding the Spratly Islands, and the U. S. claim for the
right to enjoy high sea freedom of navigation and overflight in the zone.
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The United States, as a non鄄party to the LOS Convention, but relying on the
rules of customary international law, claims that all States enjoy high seas freedoms of
navigation and overflight in the Chinese EEZs, including the right to conduct militar鄄
y鄄related activities, such as naval exercises, aerial reconnaissance, and hydrographic
survey. China disagrees by citing Article 58 and Article 301 of the LOS Convention
and other rules under international law in support of the position that the U. S. mili鄄
tary鄄related activities conducted in China蒺s EEZs are in violation of rules of interna鄄
tional law, and therefore has been repeatedly asking the United States not to conduct
the military鄄related freedom of navigation or overflight in the zones. But the United
States does not consider the Chinese request legitimate. It is likely that the United
States, together with its allies, such as Japan and Australia, and other partners, such
as India, will continuously take actions to challenge the Chinese claims in the waters
surrounding the Spratly Islands, in particular, the Chinese actions that aim to limit or
regulate foreign States蒺 right to the freedom of navigation and overflight in its EEZs. A
joint U. S. -Japan-Australia military exercise, a U. S. -Vietnam, or a U. S. - the
Philippines naval exercise, if conducted in the area within the Chinese claimed EEZs
in the waters surrounding the Spratly Islands, will certainly trigger tension between
China and the countries concerned. A new maritime security regime in the South Chi鄄
na Sea, which has been proposed by the United States, Japan, and Member States of
ASEAN and will be discussed at the upcoming 19 th ASEAN Summit, the 3 rd U. S. -
ASEAN Leaders Meeting, and the 6 th East Asian Summit, will bring both political
and legal challenges to China in defending its sovereign rights and jurisdiction claim
in the EEZs of the Paracel and Spratly Islands.
The legal basis for claiming EEZ or continental shelf in the Paracel and Spratly
Islands is on the correct interpretation and application of Article 121 of the LOS Con鄄
vention, in particular its third paragraph. It is likely for China to cite the U. S. prac鄄
tice for claiming a 200-nautical-mile EEZ for those remote islands situated in the
Western and Central Pacific in support of its claim in the Spratly Islands. If the Unit鄄
ed States can adopt a “pick鄄and鄄choose冶 strategy in interpreting and applying Article
121(3) of the LOS Convention, it would be difficult for the United States to oppose
China蒺s position, in which it interprets and applies the same article in the same way
as the United States has done for the Pacific remote islands. Accordingly, it would be
considered necessary, not only for China and the United States, but also for other
countries that are bordering or using the South China Sea, to clarify their positions on
the interpretation and application of Article 121(3) in accordance with the generally
recognized rules and principles under international law.
Although it is envisaged that resolving jurisdictional disputes in the South China
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Sea would be time鄄consuming and fraught with difficulties, challenges and complexi鄄
ty, a number of actions could still be considered by China and the United Sates to
help avoid the potential disputes that arise from conflicting interpretation and applica鄄
tion of the relevant provisions of the LOS Convention in the Paracel and Spratly are鄄
as. The possible actions could include: a special effort made by the United States to
become a party to the LOS Convention; a need for both China and the United States
to make compromises and modify their respective position on the rights and duties of
the coastal State and third parties in the EEZ; a need for Beijing and Washington to
clarify the legal basis for claiming the right to generate an EEZ or continental shelf for
their respective mid鄄ocean islands in accordance with Article 121(3) of the Conven鄄
tion; and the possibility for the consideration of including the issue concerning poten鄄
tial jurisdictional disputes in the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the agenda of their bi鄄
lateral dialogue meetings, such as MMCA, U. S. -China Asia Pacific Consultations,
and U. S. -China Strategic and Economic Dialogue.
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